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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
Censorship, Academic Freedom and Legal 




This paper provides an analysis of a dimension of the legal environment within which academic freedom 
in The Bahamas was encroached upon by government agencies of The Bahamas exercising regulatory 
authority over the public viewing of a film.  The analysis was conducted through an inquiry to determine 
whether the constitutional right of freedom of expression was violated when academicians, having 
organized a public study session relating to censorship, were prohibited from using footage from a banned 
film as part of their study session.  The paper suggests that Bahamian courts, based on the analysis 
presented in the paper, would conclude that the regulatory actions of the administrative agency in 
question constituted a breach of the constitutional right of freedom of expression.    
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INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2006, the Bahamas Plays and Films 
Control Board (the Board), an administrative 
authority established under the Theatres and 
Cinemas Act (1975), refused local theatres 
permission to show a film about a love affair 
between two men, after having initially approved 
the film for showing.  The requirement that all 
public performances of a film be approved for 
showing by the Board is found in s. 6(1) of the 
Theatres and Cinemas Act of 1975, which reads: 
“Subject to the following provisions of this Act, 
no public performances or exhibition shall be 
given otherwise than in circumstances approved 
by the Board pursuant to regulations made under 
subs. (2).”  Public performance or exhibition, in 
accordance with the Act, means a “performance of 
a play, or, as the case may be, an exhibition of a 
film, in a public place; or a performance of a play 
or …exhibition of a film which the public ….are 
permitted to attend …”  The meaning of “public 
place” in the Act is defined broadly with reference 
to s. 4 of the Penal Code (1927).  Pertinent 
regulations made under s. 6(2) of the Theatres and 
Cinemas Act (1975), for the purposes of this 
inquiry, are contained in the regulations that 
require the Board to classify films approved to be 
shown in order to regulate the conditions under 
which various age groups are entitled to view a 
film.  More important is the subsidiary censorship 
regulation that requires the Board to withhold 
approval of a film, or any part thereof, “which in 
the opinion of the Board depicts any matter that is 
against public order or decency or the exhibition 
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or performance of which would for any other 
reason be undesirable in the public interest” 
(Theatres and Cinemas (Censorship) Regulations, 
1976, s. 6(1)) 
In response to the huge stir generated by the 
banning of the film in question, academics in the 
School of Social Sciences and the School of 
English Studies at The College of The Bahamas, 
began to prepare a free, public study session to 
examine the topic: “Church, State, and Human 
Rights: The Politics of Censorship”.  In a rationale 
provided to senior administrators at their 
institution, they asserted that the study session 
would be geared towards “informing the public of 
some of the important constitutional, political, and 
national developmental issues and problems 
surrounding the work of the Bahamas Plays and 
Films Control Board” (Stevenson, Minnis, & 
Strachan, personal communication, May 10, 
2006).  In their rationale they also outlined how 
the study session would be organized: a panel of 
academic presentations on the topic of the study 
session would proceed after short excerpts from 
the banned film were shown. 
On the second evening of the study session, a full 
showing of the banned film that had stirred such a 
controversy would be shown, to be followed by a 
question-and-answer period with the participants 
of the study session.  With all of this information 
included in a letter to the Chairperson of the 
Board, the academics organizing the public study 
session applied for permission from the Board to 
show the banned film to an audience of persons 
aged eighteen years and older.  
Two related questions need to be answered at this 
juncture.  Firstly, why did the organizers of the 
planned study session want to show excerpts from 
the banned film at their study session as originally 
conceived? Secondly, why did the study session 
organizers apply for permission from the Board to 
show the film in public knowing that the same 
Board had earlier refused to approve the film for 
public viewing? 
To the first question, the response (known by the 
author because he was one of the organizers of the 
study session) is that as educators and organizers 
of the study session, the organizers knew that the 
banned film had created a learning opportunity for 
the community (the expanded classroom) to begin 
to examine the decision making process (inclusive 
of influencing factors) of an administrative body 
charged with the task of regulating public 
consumption of plays and films.  They had 
anticipated that by showing excerpts from the 
banned film, along with clips from approved 
films, those attending the study session would 
begin to inspect and question closely the criteria 
used by the Board in reaching its decisions, the 
Board’s interpretation of such criteria, and the 
consistency of the Board’s decision-making. 
The planners of the event understood that showing 
actual footage of both banned and non-banned 
material would make the study session more vivid 
and real than simply having a “chalk and talk” 
session—the use of visual aids being a standard 
tool used in learning.  At the same time, they did 
not see why adult members of the public should 
be deprived of the educational benefit of studying 
along with other adults engaged in the pursuit of 
information relating to the practice of censorship 
in The Bahamas, or be deprived of the views of 
academics on the matter.  After all, they 
maintained, The College of The Bahamas was a 
public institution, and as educators paid from the 
public purse, they believed the “classroom” 
extended beyond the “walls” of the conventional 
site of learning.  Moreover, it was clear to them 
that the community expected The College of The 
Bahamas to play a public educational role in 
society and that it had done so on many occasions 
in the past.  They had to look no further for 
evidence of this understanding than their own 
professional evaluation categories requiring 
community service and the long history of public 
seminars and colloquia conducted at their 
institution.  
As for the question directed at the ostensible 
futility of applying for permission to show a film 
that had already been banned, the organizers’ 
response held fast to the view that it would be 
absurd if a decision by the Board to ban a film to 
be used in a certain public context meant that the 
same film could never be shown in any other 
public context.  In their view, which they were 
certain had the backing of common-law precedent, 
if the Board were ever to not exercise its 
discretionary powers when a new application to 
approve a banned film was presented to it (on the 
basis that the old prohibition automatically 
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applied to the circumstances surrounding the new 
application) then these actions of the Board could 
be subjected to judicial review on the ground that 
the Board had failed to exercise its authority as 
required of it, and thereby had exceeded its 
statutory powers. (Singh v. Chinilall, 1963)  
Further, they felt that if it were within the power 
of the Board to make such sweeping decisions to 
prohibit a film and not be duty-bound to re-
evaluate its decision upon the request of an 
applicant in circumstances different from those of 
previous applicants, films banned during a certain 
era, or for use in a certain context, like the film 
Jesus Christ Superstar that was banned in The 
Bahamas in the 70’s, could legally remain 
automatically censored across changing social 
settings and into eternity. 
All of these considerations pointed them towards 
the conclusion that a reasonable construction of 
the Theatres and Cinemas Act 1975 and the 
powers of the Board must be based on the 
assumption that Parliament had intended to create 
the possibility for the Board to review its own 
decisions when requested, especially those 
decisions that related to the banning of a film or 
play.  And so, having assumed this to be one of 
the duties of the Board, the three College of The 
Bahamas academicians (the organizers of the 
study session) applied to the Board for permission 
to show the banned film given the changed 
circumstances that its public viewing at the study 
session would be for purely public educational 
purposes. 
The Board’s response to their application, via the 
Ministry of National Security, was that once a 
film was banned it could not be shown for public 
viewing.  The response to the application 
submitted by the academics to the Board came 
from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
National Security.  The response was addressed to 
the Acting President of The College of The 
Bahamas.  There is evidence to suggest that the 
Board may have not exercised its authority in 
relation to the application and allowed the 
Ministry of National Security to make the 
decision.  A clear line of judicial authority 
indicates that if this were to have been the case, 
the Board’s abdication of authority in the matter 
would have amounted to an abuse of discretionary 
power by the Board. (See D’Aguiar v. Attorney-
General, 1962)  For reasons already stated, the 
blanket decision of the Board suggested a 
complete failure by the Board to carry out its 
statutory duties, and, in the view of the organizers, 
made the Board’s refusal easily subject to judicial 
review.  Nevertheless, in their view, the more 
pressing concern was to assume that the Board 
had exercised its discretion and to then question 
the constitutionality of the Board’s refusal to 
allow them to show the banned film as part of 
their planned study session. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
By virtue of Article 23 (1) of The Constitution of 
The Bahamas (1973), freedom of expression, 
defined in the article as the “freedom to hold 
opinions, to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference, and freedom 
from interference with [one’s] correspondence,” is 
protected from being hindered.   
As with most of the individual rights and 
freedoms under the Constitution of The Bahamas 
and other Commonwealth Caribbean 
constitutions, the protection of freedom of 
expression offered by the Constitution is not 
absolute.  In certain circumstances, defined 
somewhat vaguely in the Constitution, freedom of 
expression can be restricted if the restriction is the 
result of the operation of a law or action done 
under the authority of law that is “reasonably 
required” in the interest of public ends itemized in 
Art. 23; with the proviso that the said restriction 
must be also “reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.”  
The first question, then, that would have to be 
answered as part of an inquiry into the 
constitutionality of the Board’s decision, is 
whether the freedom of the organizers of the study 
session to impart ideas free from interference was 
hindered by the Board’s decision not to allow the 
banned film to be used as part of the study 
session.  This can only be answered by discerning 
what ideas the organizers were hoping to impart 
by the showing of the banned film at the study 
session and whether the decision of the Board 
hindered that process of transmission.  As already 
stated, it was thought by the organizers that 
showing excerpts from the banned film, along 
with clips from approved films, would have 
provided those persons attending the study session 
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with the opportunity to begin to closely inspect 
and question the criteria used by the Board in 
reaching its decisions, the Board’s interpretation 
of  those criteria, the consistency of the Board’s 
decision-making, and the social and political 
forces shaping both these matters of interpretation 
and consistency.  What the educators organizing 
the event were hoping to impart to the public in 
attendance, then, was a critical framework and the 
opportunity to apply that critical framework to 
banned material as well as material that had not 
been banned. 
It was also understood by the organizers of the 
study session that the various academic 
presentations arranged by them would impart 
ideas pivotal to the formation of this critical 
framework and its application.  The organizers of 
the study session had hoped that showing of the 
banned and approved clips in the context of the 
scholarly presentations they had organized and 
their anticipation of the interactions of 
participants, would have conveyed the critical 
framework they hoped would have been adopted 
by the study session participants.  Additionally, 
none of them was apologetic for wanting to impart 
this critical framework for analyzing the work of 
the censorship board within a context that by 
convention had always been linked to the 
democratic participatory duties of the citizen—
namely, that of the public forum.  
What the study session organizers had hoped to 
achieve with the showing of the excerpts from the 
banned film, in the context of the study session as 
a whole, was thrown into doubt by the actions of 
the Board.  The visuals would have allowed 
precise comparisons between banned and non-
banned films.  Greater insight into the critical 
issues generated by such comparisons would have 
arisen had clips from the banned film been used.  
Generally, the Board’s decision to prohibit the use 
of the banned film at the study interfered with the 
formation of the critical insight the organizers had 
hoped to impart at the study session. 
Of course, all the arguments advanced here that 
explain how the organizers’ rights to transmit 
ideas and information were hindered also explain 
how the rights of participants at the study session 
to receive ideas and information were also 
hindered.  In addition, they stand as a refutation of 
the argument that the availability of the banned 
film on video, DVD, TV, etc, for private use 
meant that the banning of the public use of the 
film did not hinder freedom of expression.  As 
already explained, the study session had been 
organized to impart a critical perspective 
regarding the work of the Board, and the film 
would have been used as a learning tool.  
Establishing that an apparent hindrance to 
freedom of expression was caused by the Board’s 
decision would constitute only the first part of the 
test to determine whether freedom of expression 
had been infringed by the Board.  The right to 
freedom of expression is not absolute.  Under Art. 
23 of the Constitution, limitations placed on 
freedom of expression will only be considered 
constitutionally valid if the courts determine, as 
part of the overall constitutional test contained in 
Art. 23, that limitations arising as the result of a 
law, or actions taken under the authority of law, 
are considered to be reasonably required in the 
interests of the enumerated public interest grounds 
that fall within Art. 23.  Additionally, for the 
limitation to be considered valid, the courts must 
determine that the reasonably required limitation 
can be considered reasonably justified in a 
democratic society.  The way that Art. 23 is 
worded and structured in the Constitution suggests 
that once the law being constitutionally 
challenged is regarded as reasonably required then 
any actions taken under the authority of that law 
will be considered to be reasonably required.  
Legal certainty, the test of reasonable 
requirement, and the test of reasonable democratic 
justification constitute the three elements of the 
overall test to determine the constitutional validity 
of a limitation placed on freedom of expression. 
Legal Certainty  
The requirement of legal certainty for all 
limitations placed on fundamental rights is an 
expression of the Rule of Law doctrine that 
opposes the arbitrary curtailment of liberty.  
Straightforward interpretations of Art. 23, and all 
other articles in the Bill of Rights of the 
Constitution, maintain that limitations placed on a 
fundamental freedom must be contained in a rule, 
or based on a decision made under the authority of 
a rule.  The rule itself must be crafted with 
sufficient certainty and authority for it to be 
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considered a rule of law. (deFreitas v. Permanent 
Secretary of Agriculture & Fisheries, Lands and 
Housings and Others, 1998) 
Section 6(1), which places in the hands of the 
Board the power to prohibit a film or play from 
being exhibited to a public audience prior to its 
release to the public, arguably fails the legal 
certainty test.  In the words of a prominent 
Bahamian constitutional law practitioner, the 
Board has been granted censorial powers under s. 
6(1) to ensure public order and decency and to 
uphold public interest, but “no criteria [in law] has 
[sic] been set for the board to follow”. (Mortimer, 
2007) 
The extremely wide and arbitrary powers given to 
the Board to determine what constitutes a threat to 
public order and decency, and to determine when 
the content of a play or film is undesirable in the 
public interest, fails to provide clear, certain, and 
predictable limits of freedom of expression 
relating to films and plays.  Support for this 
approach to the problem can be found in Ontario’s 
Court of Appeal decision in Ontario Film and 
Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Censor 
Board, 1983.  It was held in this case that Ontario 
censorship powers limiting freedom of expression 
under the Bill of Rights in the Canadian Charter 
were unconstitutional as the censorship powers 
were not sufficiently specific for them to be 
regarded as being contained within a “prescribed 
law.” 
Assuming that s. 6(1) would pass the test of legal 
certainty, the next step in the constitutional test 
would be to determine whether s. 6(1) could be 
considered “reasonably required” in the interest of 
an enumerated public interest within the article. 
Reasonable Requirement  
In Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional case 
law, it has been recognized since the Privy 
Council decision in Hinds v. The Queen, 1977 that 
enactments of Parliament under the legislative 
powers contained within Commonwealth 
Caribbean constitutions are presumed to be 
reasonably required in the interest of relevant 
enumerated public interest grounds.  The 
presumption can only be rebutted if the court, 
considering the constitutionality of legislation, 
considers in no uncertain terms (notwithstanding 
the introduction of implied terms by courts 
attempting to save the legislation from 
constitutional challenge) that the allegedly 
impugned enactment is not reasonably required in 
the interest of a relevant enumerated public 
interest within the applied limitation provision of 
the Constitution.  
The modern test in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
concerning what constitutes a law that is 
reasonably required in the interest of an 
enumerated constitutional interest (the 
rationality/proportionality test) is found in 
deFreitas v. Permanent Secretary of Agriculture 
& Fisheries, Lands and Housings and Others, 
1998.)  According to this locus classicus on the 
testing of the proportionality of enacted 
limitations to fundamental freedoms, the 
following test of proportionality must be applied 
to determine whether an enacted limitation can be 
considered reasonably required:  
Is the legislative objective sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental 
freedom?  
Is the limiting provision rationally connected 
to the legislative objective?  
Is the limiting provision no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective (i.e., is it 
excessive)?  
Negative responses to any one of these questions 
would provide a court with sufficient justification 
to declare a limitation unconstitutional.  A cursory 
analysis shows that the legislative objective of the 
Theatres and Cinemas Act (1975) and, 
specifically, s. 6(1) of the regulations made under 
the Act, would be considered by Caribbean courts 
sufficiently important to justify limiting the right 
to freedom of expression.  Rangarajan v Jagjivan 
Ram, 1990 is one in a plethora of cases in the 
wider Commonwealth that support the proposition 
that “censorship by prior restraint is not only 
desirable but also necessary” (p. 417).  Similarly, 
it is clear that the powers of the Bahamas Plays 
and Films Control Board under s. 6(1) of the 
regulations are rationally connected to the prior 
restraints objective of the principal Act.  The 
question whether the powers under s. 6(1) are 
excessive raises the most concern about the 
constitutional validity of these powers, that is, 
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whether these powers would be considered 
reasonably required.  
The following analysis concerning the excessive 
nature of the Board’s powers contained in s. 6(1) 
suggests that the issue of proportionality is linked 
to the test of legal certainty and the test of 
reasonable democratic justification.  For a start, to 
the extent that s. 6(1) is considered excessive, the 
argument can be made it is because the provision 
lacks legal certainty.  The more specific the 
criteria for the exercise of power contained in a 
provision, the more unlikely it is that it will be 
regarded as an overly vague provision that can 
give rise to the excesses produced by its 
application.  
Concerning the latter linkage, the actual excesses 
produced by the discharge of powers under s. 6(1) 
can be assessed by considering the various ways 
in which the actions of the Bahamas Plays and 
Films Control Board offended the various aspects 
of the principle of democracy upon which the test 
of reasonable democratic justification is founded.  
And if the actions of the Board carried out under 
the authority of s. 6(1) constitute actions that 
cannot be regarded as reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society, then this speaks to the 
excessive discretionary power contained in the 
provision itself and, thus, to its disproportional 
character when considering whether the provision 
itself passes the test of the reasonably required 
limitation.  This is because under Art. 23 of the 
Constitution, for an enacted limitation of a 
fundamental freedom to be considered 
constitutionally valid, in addition to passing the 
test of proportionality, the enacted limitation and 
the “things done under the authority” of the 
statutory authorization must be shown to be 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.  
The point then to be emphasized here is that the 
proportionality test and the test of democratic 
justification are closely connected and integrated 
tests.  Can s. 6(1) and, more importantly, the 
actions that were taken under the authority of this 
regulation be considered reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society?  
Reasonable Democratic Justification 
Given the scope of what might be considered 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society or 
not, it is reasonable to argue, were the Board’s 
decision to have been constitutionally challenged, 
that the bulk of the court’s creative energies and 
that of the lawyers involved in the case would 
have been taken up attempting to resolve the 
following question: is it reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society for a censor board, acting 
under the authority that it did, to effectively 
prohibit academics from showing a banned film 
for the purpose of conducting a study session on 
the topic of censorship? In answering this 
question, two lines of argument will be used to 
suggest why the actions of the Board, in the 
context of the situation that has been described, 
should not be considered reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society.  By suggesting them, they 
become part of the legal context within which 
prior-restraints censorship of publicly exhibited 
films for adult educational purposes can be 
situated.  
ACADEMIC FREEDOM  
The first argument might be called the “academic 
freedom argument”.  This position advances the 
idea that the pursuit of truth, freed from the moral 
and political will of people in society, is a 
principle of utmost importance in societies that 
value democratic rule.  It could be argued that this 
principle not only immunizes the place reserved 
for the academy in democratic society, but also 
wraps the press in its protective veil.  Arguably, 
the principle forms part of a wider discourse that 
has prevailed with the rise of Western modernity.  
This discourse regards the pursuit of truth and 
power as mutually exclusive processes.  Critics of 
this way of thinking point to the way that this 
discourse often obscures the way in which 
discourses of truth, and the institutions devoted to 
its production, are themselves inscribed within 
power relations and are themselves producers of 
power (Foucault & Gordon, 1977).  Still, the 
conventional understanding that power corrupts 
truth, that the academy—and more generally that 
rational speech itself as an engine of truth needs to 
be given a special and protected place in society 
free of political, social, and economic interference 
or forces of distortion—is an understanding that 
could be used to advance the argument that the 
Board’s decision ran against a very hallowed 
principle of the modern democracy.  Habermas's 
(1984) sophisticated defense of the possibility of 
‘speech situations’ freed of the distorting 
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influences of power provides strong support for 
this position.  
For the academic freedom argument to be 
successful however, it needs to be coupled to 
another argument that emphasizes the position 
that, within a democratic setting although the 
academy is reserved a special and somewhat 
protected space to practice freedom of expression, 
that space should not be confined to the privacy of 
the virtual or non-virtual private classroom.  The 
core question, in this regard, is this: to what extent 
does or should the privilege of academic freedom 
accompany the academy beyond the private 
classroom as the academy expresses its public role 
in society?  The Ministry of National Security and 
the Bahamas Plays and Films Control Board were 
of the view that academic freedom operated only 
within the confines of the private classroom. 
(Swain, 2006)  They pointed out that this 
explained their decision not to allow the showing 
of the banned film at the public study session.  In 
a constitutional challenge to this reasoning, it 
would have to be shown that it is precisely in the 
academy’s public role, or for that matter that of 
the press, where attempts at the formation of truth 
freed from the interference of power become so 
vital for a democracy.  This line of argument is 
strengthened when the role of informed consent 
in, and for, a properly functioning democracy is 
fully understood.  To this, the counter-argument 
could only be that in a democracy the value of 
academic freedom in the public sphere, for the 
purposes of creating informed consent, has to be 
balanced, on a case-by-case basis, against the 
possible harm caused in each such case to the 
public interest.  The balancing-of-interests 
operation that such arguments would compel the 
judiciary to undertake, would require the judiciary 
to assess the specific public harm possibly caused 
by a specific public exercise of academic freedom 
functioning in support of the democratic process.  
Given the analysis so far, it is difficult to imagine 
courts in The Bahamas placing greater value on 
protecting the public from a vaguely defined 
public-morality harm that might befall the public 
as a result of adults gathering publicly in the 
company of academics at a place of education to 
learn about censorship with reference to an 
acclaimed film that contained homosexual content 
than on protecting the principle of academic 
freedom and the function that it plays (or might 
play) in the processes of informed-consent 
formation within a democracy.  Regarding the 
public-morality harm, one can only speculate that 
it might be suggested that somehow by showing 
banned footage involving homosexuality, in the 
context of an academic discussion about the 
rationality of the censorship process in The 
Bahamas, homosexuality was being endorsed as 
an acceptable practice in a society where it is 
regarded as morally offensive. 
RATIONALITY 
The second line of argument might be called the 
“rationality argument”.  It would advance the 
position that one of the ideas upon which a 
democracy is predicated is the notion that 
governmental agencies are accountable, and that 
governments must account for many things, one 
of them being the rationality of their actions and 
decisions when exercising statutory powers 
reposed in them by citizens through the legislative 
authority of their elected representatives.  As part 
of that position, the claim would be made that 
irrational decision-making on the part of public 
agencies exercising discretionary statutory power 
is never reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society.  It would then be argued that the refusal 
of the Board to allow the showing of the banned 
film at the study session—the apparent 
encroachment upon freedom of expression—was 
an irrational exercise of discretionary power by 
the Board that was not reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. 
One source of support for this line of argument 
could be gleaned from cases and principles of 
administrative law in the Caribbean and the wider 
Commonwealth that shows rather emphatically 
that no public authority exercising discretionary 
statutory power has the authority to exercise 
power in a way that is irrational.  Courts have 
justified on many occasions their jurisdiction to 
intervene in cases involving the irrational exercise 
of statutory powers by an administrative agency 
on the ground that a reasonable way of construing 
the meaning of such powers is to assume that their 
authors intended for them to be rationally 
exercised. (Council of Civil Service Unions  
Minister for the Civil Service, 1984)  It would be a 
novel line of argumentation, fusing principles of 
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administrative and constitutional law.  
But what would be the substance of the claim that 
the Board’s decision was irrational?  Simply this: 
if the study session, as originally conceived, had 
been conducted in the ‘privacy’ of the classroom 
with college students (some of whom would be 
beneath the age of 18) and the prohibited film had 
been used as a teaching aid, no authority could 
have legitimately intervened to prohibit the use of 
the film.  In fact the Ministry of National Security 
indicated that this would have been perfectly 
acceptable (Swain, 2006).  Yet given this fact, the 
Board maintained the opinion that for the 
academics organizing the study session to have 
shown the banned film at an academic study 
session for adults only would have been indecent 
and undesirable in the public interest.  The 
potential absurdity created by this exercise of the 
Board’s authority is self evident.  And it would 
not be sufficient for the Board, in response to this 
argument, to have said that its authority did not 
extend into the private sphere.  It is precisely 
because the Board had no authority to regulate in 
the private sphere what films minors or young 
persons view that makes it completely irrational 
for the Board to prohibit adults from publicly 
viewing films being shown for educational 
purposes. 
A refutation of this position must assert a counter 
argument: that the general public is harmed when 
it learns that a film, with content thought to be 
morally damaging to society, has been shown to 
adults for educational purposes.  As part of this 
riposte, it would also have to be contended and 
supported that—within the tight parameters of 
public adult education—society, or segments 
within it, would be more inclined to regard as 
acceptable the content of such a film as a result of 
it being shown.  This line of reasoning would 
have to be built on the presumption that the 
general public, or segments of the public, could 
not differentiate between the moral implications 
of adults watching a film in public for educational 
purposes, on the one hand, and that of them 
watching a film for entertainment, on the other.  
Furthermore, such reasoning would have to 
presume that segments within the public, or the 
public in general, would be less harmed from 
knowing that minors were watching a film 
considered harmful by the authorities in the 
private classroom or at home, than by knowing 
that adults in public were watching the same film 
for educational purposes.  Both presumptions 
reveal on their face how difficult it would be to 
support them, and how potentially irrational it 
would be for the Board to have to assert them.  
Based on these arguments, the Board's refusal to 
allow the showing of the banned film for public 
educational purposes would in all likelihood be 
considered not reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.  Thus, the argument could be 
made that the powers upon which the refusal was 
founded were disproportional and ultimately 
failed the test required of it to be considered a 
reasonably required limitation. 
SUMMARY 
Viewing censored footage is a reasonable method 
for adults to study film censorship; showing such 
footage is a reasonable method to present ideas 
relating to such studies.  There is also a long 
tradition of academics sharing the findings of their 
studies with members of the public and to involve 
the public in the process of conducting inquiries 
(especially when their participation forms part of 
the research data of the inquiry).  In the case study 
described, the academics involved in the 
organization of the study session on censorship 
had sound, academic reasons for wanting to use a 
banned film in their study session.  The refusal of 
the Board to allow the use of the banned film at 
the study session thwarted the organizers’ ability 
to achieve their purpose for wanting to use the 
banned film.  Arguably, in terms of the first part 
of the test of constitutionality of the Board’s 
action, this amounted to a hindrance of the 
academics’ right to impart ideas free from 
interference.  The powers the Board acted under 
would be regarded as disproportional because the 
actions taken by the Board could not be regarded 
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